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Abstract
Informational asymmetries have long been recognized as one of the causes of wasteful
conflicts. Signaling has been found to be an effective tool for interested parties to truthfully
communicate private information. Can signaling help reduce the risk of conflict? I study
this question in a model in which a Sender sends a signal about his privately known cost of
conflict, a Receiver makes an offer, and the Sender decides whether or not to start a conflict.
I find that an equilibrium with no conflict exists only if the outcome of conflict depends on
the Receiver’s offer and the Sender’s possible costs are sufficiently apart. Importantly, these
conditions are never satisfied in the context of wars where belligerents obtain all or none of a
dispute territory. In such context, no information is ever transmitted in equilibrium. Overall,
this paper establishes that the shadow of conflict renders signaling quite ineffective to resolve
informational asymmetry.
∗London School of Economics. Email: s.wolton@lse.ac.uk
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From wars to trials via strikes, conflicts occur various forms despite their cost and the risk they
involve all interested parties. This puzzle has led a large literature to investigate the sources of a
conflict. One commonly recognized cause is informational asymmetry. But are these informational
asymmetries inescapable? Are there means to eliminate them?
In this paper, I consider one potential decentralized mechanism to reduce asymmetry of in-
formation: costly signaling. I find that signaling facilitates information transmission only under
restrictive conditions on the form of conflict and distribution of private information. Importantly,
wars, as they are usually modeled, do not meet these conditions. Signaling never allows for any
information transmission prior to military action: the unique equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium.
These results contrast with dozens of studies which find that signaling helps information transmis-
sion even when players have strong incentives to misrepresent themselves. They, however, can be
explained by a single factor: the shadow of conflict.
Formally, I build upon bargaining models of war. A Sender has private information about his
cost of conflict, whereas the Receiver’s cost is commonly known. In a first stage, the Sender can
send a signal at a cost satisfying increasing differences (i.a., increasing his signal becomes more
costly as the Sender’s cost of conflict increases). After observing the Sender’s signal, a Receiver
makes an to the Sender. The latter then decides whether to start a conflict. A conflict takes the
form of a lottery over various potential outcomes.
In the paper, I distinguish between two different forms of lottery: fixed-outcome and offer-
dependent lotteries. In fixed-outcome lotteries, the possible outcomes of the conflict do not depend
on the Receiver’s offer. This corresponds to several well-known situations. Armed conflicts are
usually modeled as winner-takes-all lotteries in which the payoff from victory does not depend on
a country’s prior concessions (Ramsay, 2017). Signaling here assumes the form of staging military
parade, missile tests, demonstrations, or protestations at the United Nation organization. This
representation of conflicts also applies to trials as plea bargain offers do not constraint future legal
proceedings (Silveira, 2017). Here, delaying tactics can be thought as signals. Another possible
example is strikes whose successes or failures have little to do with the wage offer prior to collective
action and for which trade unions can use tracts and posters to signal their ability to mobilize their
members. In turn, in offer-dependent lotteries, one or more possible outcomes strictly increases
with the Receiver’s offer. This type of conflict is less common, but not unknown. Wolton (2017)
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models outside lobbying activities as an offer-dependent lottery (the Receiver’s offer is a bill which
is either enacted or abandoned) with informative lobbying and contributions serving as signals.
The form of conflict plays a critical role for information transmission. If the conflict is a fixed-
outcome lottery, then the unique equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium. To understand this result,
suppose that the Sender’s cost can take only two values: high or low. If the Sender were to reveal
his cost, the Receiver would make a compromise offer which leaves the Sender indifferent between
starting a conflict and accepting the offer (any other offer, I show, is dominated). Now suppose that
a low-cost Sender pretends to be a high-type Sender. The Receiver’s offer is then less attractive
than the compromise offer for a low-cost, and the Sender starts a conflict. Because the conflict is
a fixed-outcome lottery, a low-cost Sender’s expected payoff from imitating a high-cost is exactly
the same as his payoff from revealing his type: the expected payoff from a conflict. A low-cost
Sender has thus no gain from differentiating himself from a high type and is not willing to pay any
signaling cost. Let us now turn to a high-cost Sender. If he pretends to be a low-cost, he obtains
a compromise offer which makes the low-cost Sender indifferent between conflict and peace. This
is always more attractive that the compromise offer he obtains from truthfully revealing his type.
In other words, a high-cost Sender has a positive benefit from imitating a low-cost Sender and the
signaling cost must be positive to avoid him mimicking a low type. Of course, the two conditions
cannot be satisfied simultaneously, and information transmission is impossible. The reasoning
above applies to all informative equilibria for all possible fixed-outcome lotteries, all (additively
separable) continuous utility functions, and all distribution of the Sender’s costs. In all cases, there
is no information transmission in equilibrium.
When the conflict takes the form of an offer-dependent lottery, a low-cost Sender gets some
benefit from differentiation since the outcome of the conflict depends on the offer on the table
to begin with. Because of the possibility of conflict, however, a low-cost Sender’s benefit from
differentiation is strictly lower than a high-cost Sender’s benefit from imitation. A low-cost Sender
then is only willing to send a relatively low costly signal to reveal his type. For separation to oc-
cur, it must be that even this relatively low signal is too expensive for a high-cost Sender. This is
possible only if the two types are sufficiently apart (taking advantage of the increasing difference in
signaling costs). The reasoning above thus implies that a separating equilibrium never exists when
the set of possible Sender’s cost contains an interval (as types are too close) and exists only under
restrictive conditions when the Sender’s costs take discrete values. While information transmission
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is possible with offer-dependent lottery, it does not occur generically.
A large literature studies the relationship between uncertainty and conflict (for two excellent
recent reviews, see Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m, 2013 and Ramsay, 2017). Few papers, however, consider
whether signaling can alleviate informational asymmetries and reduce the risk of conflict. Baliga
and Sjo¨stro¨m (2004) and Kydd (2005) show how cheap talk can be effective in term of reducing
the risk of arm races. However, their results rely on arm races being a form of prisoner’s dilemma
and thus players having some commonality of interest. This is not the case in bargaining model
of war. In such context, my paper extends the signaling analysis in Arena (2013). While Arena
considers a single utility function (linear), single lottery (winner-takes-all), and binary signals,
I look at the effectiveness of signaling for all continuous utility functions, all lotteries, and all
possible signals. Finally, my finding can be related to recent works on mediation (Ho¨rner, Morelli,
and Squintani, 2015; Meirowitz et al., 2017). These papers show that in the optimal mediation
equilibrium, the probability of war is strictly positive to induce participants to truthfully reveal
their private information. In turn, I establish that there is no decentralized mechanism which
guarantees information revelation because of the shadow of war.
1 Set-up
I study a one-period game with a Sender (S) and a Receiver (R). The receiver makes an offer
aR ∈ [a, a], with (without loss of generality) 0 ≤ a < a. Depending on contexts, the offer is a
division of a disputed territory, a plea bargain offer, a wage rise, or the content of a bill. After
observing aR, the Sender can decide whether to start a conflict: fS ∈ {0, 1}, with 1 denoting
conflict. The conflict corresponds to a war, going to trial, going on strike, or outside lobbying
activities. A conflict has two consequences. First, a conflict affects the outcome of the game,
denoted z: no conflict leads to outcome z = aR with probability 1, whereas conflict generates a
lottery L(aR) over possible outcomes. Second, a conflict imposes a cost on both players. I describe
these two aspects in turn.
Denote z(aR) = {z1(aR), . . . , zN(aR)} ∈ [a, a]N , N ≥ 2, the set of possible outcomes in a conflict
(fS = 1) with zj(·) < zj+1(·) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , N−1}. Denote as well p = {p1, . . . , pN} ∈ ∆(z(aR))
the associated probability distribution over outcomes (i.e., Pr(z = zj(·)) = pj for all j). The lottery
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L can be represented as L(aR) =< z(aR),p >. Throughout, I suppose that L(·) is non-degenerate
(i.e., there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that pj ∈ (0, 1)). I distinguish between a fixed-outcome
lottery in which zj(aR) is constant in aR for all j ∈ {1, . . . , N} and an offer-dependent lottery
in which there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , N} such as zj(aR) is strictly increasing in aR. A commonly
used fixed-outcome lottery in the literature is the winner-takes-all lottery: z(aR) = {a, a} and
p = {p, 1 − p} for all aR ∈ [a, a]. An example of offer-dependent lottery is z = {a, aR} and
p = {p, 1− p} so that the Receiver either obtains a or his offer aR.
The cost of conflict for the Receiver is common knowledge and equals kR > 0. The cost for
the Sender is his private information (type) and denoted kS. Types are drawn from a commonly
known type space KS ⊆ [kS, kS] with 0 < kS < kS according to the common knowledge cumulative
distribution function F (·). Throughout, I assume that F (·) is non-degenerate and without loss of
generality kS, kS ∈ K2S. Note that KS can be an interval (i.e., F (·) is continuous) or a discrete set
(i.e., F (·) exhibits discontinuities). At the beginning of the game, the Sender can send a signal
sS ∈ R+ to reveal his type. The cost of signal sS is C(sS, kS). I assume that C(·, kS) is strictly
increasing in sS with lim
sS→∞
C(sS, kS) =∞ for all kS ∈ KS.
Turning to payoffs, the Receiver, without loss of generality, prefers higher outcome z. Her
utility can be represented as:
UR(aR, fS) = r(z)− fS × kR, (1)
In turn, the Sender prefers lower outcome and his utility assumes the following form:
US(aR, fS, sS) = −v(z)− fS × kS − C(sS, kS), (2)
I impose that both r(·) and v(·) are bounded, and strictly increasing over [a, a]. Further, I
assume that v(·) is C1 over [a, a] (the reasoning can be extended to a semi-continuous v(·) or
v′(·) at the cost of complicating the analysis). Observe that the model allows for players to be
risk-seeking on some subset of [a, a] (i.e., r(·) convex and/or v(·) concave).
To summarize, the game proceeds as follows:
0. Nature draws kS from KS according to the distribution F (·);
1. Sender privately observes kS and sends signal sS ≥ 0;
2. Receiver observes sS and chooses aR ∈ [a, a];
3. Sender chooses fS ∈ {0, 1};
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4. Nature determines outcome, the game ends, and payoffs are realized.
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilbrium (henceforth ‘equilibrium’). Observe that
I do not impose any equilibrium refinement (e.g., Intuitive Criterion). This means that out-of-
equilibrium beliefs are unrestricted to facilitate information transmission. I also assume that the
cost of signaling C(·, ·) is C1 and exhibits strict increasing differences. That is, for all klS, khS ∈
K2S, klS < khS and slS, shS ∈ R2+, slS < shS:
C(shS, k
h
S)− C(slS, khS) > C(shS, klS)− C(slS, klS)
This assumption is meant to increase the chances that the Sender has incentives to truthfully
signal his type at the signaling stage (stage 1.) and thus goes against the paper’s main findings
(Malaith, 1987). An example of signaling cost function satisfying strict increasing differences is
C(sS, kS) = sS × kS.
For the Sender, a signaling strategy takes the form of a mapping from his type to some real
positive value sS : [kS, kS]→ R+. Following the usual definition, a strategy is separating if for all
klS, k
h
S ∈ K2S, klS < khS, sS(klS) 6= sS(khS). A conflict strategy is a mapping from R’s offer and S’s
type to a conflict decision fS : [a, a]×KS → {0, 1}. For the Receiver R, his strategy is a mapping
from the sender’s signal to an offer aR : R+ → [a, a]. Throughout, I use the subscript ∗ to denote
equilibrium actions.
2 Analysis
I study whether signaling can resolve informational asymmetries at the source of wasteful conflicts.
To do so, I focus on the most interesting cases for which conflicts would be avoided, should
information asymmetries be eliminated.
Formally, denote acR(kS) the Receiver’s offer which leaves the Sender indifferent between starting
a conflict (fS = 1) or peace (fS = 0). I label a
c
R(kS) the compromise offer and assume it is unique
in the text (the Appendix deals with the general case). I assume that the Sender’s potential
cost of conflicts are such that compromise is always necessary and possible: a ≤ acR(kS) ≤ a for
all kS ∈ KS.1 Further, I assume that if the Receiver learns the Sender’s type, he is willing to
1Note that if a > acR(kS) for some kS ∈ KS , then conflict is unavoidable for some types. In turn, if acR(kS) > a,
some types never start a conflict. The two restrictions are with little loss of generality since we can always focus
on the subset of types for which they hold.
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compromise: r(acR(kS)) ≥ EL
(
r(z)|aR = a
) − kR for all kS ∈ KS (where the left-hand side is
the payoff from compromise and the right-hand side the highest possible expected payoff from a
conflict with expectation over lottery outcomes). Finally, absent any information at the signaling
stage, I suppose that there is a risk of conflict: apR = arg maxaR∈[a,a] E
(
US(aR; fS)|kS ∈ KS
)
(with
expectation over Sender’s type and lottery outcomes) satisfies apR > a
c
R(kS) for some kS ∈ KS.
I first consider fixed-outcome lottery. The first proposition states that signaling never reduces
by any amount the informational asymmetry.
Proposition 1. For all fixed-outcome lotteries and all type-space KS, in any equilibrium, the
Sender plays a pooling strategy: s∗S(kS) = s
p
S for all kS ∈ KS.
Proof. All proofs are collected in the Appendix
To understand this result, recall that, under the assumptions, after learning that the Sender’s
cost is kS, the Receiver chooses the compromise offer a
c
R(kS), which leaves the Sender indifferent
between conflict and peace. Since conflict is a fixed-outcome lottery, acR(kS) satisfies: −v(acR(kS)) =
−EL
(
v(z)
) − kS for all kS ∈ KS. Consider now the strategy of two types klS, khS ∈ K2S, klS < khS.
For a separating equilibrium to exist, it must be that (i) a Sender with cost khS does not want to
imitate a Sender with cost klS and (ii) a type-k
l
S is willing to differentiate himself from a type-k
h
S.
When a high-cost Sender (khS) imitates a low-cost Sender (k
l
S), he obtains a better compromise
offer and a strictly positive benefit from imitation v(acR(k
l
S)) − v(acR(khS)). Thus, to discourage
imitation by a high-cost, it must be that mimicking a low cost is costly: sS(k
l
S) > sS(k
h
S). In turn,
if a low-cost pretends to be a high-cost, the Receiver offers acR(k
h
S) > a
c
R(k
l
S) and the Sender starts
a conflict. His expected payoff is then EL
(
v(z)
) − klS, the exact same payoff as from revealing
his type. A low-cost Sender’s benefit from differentiation is thus null and he is never willing to
pay a signaling cost to reveal his type. Consequently, we can never satisfy conditions (i) and (ii)
simultaneously. The result extends to all possible equilibria with information transmission at the
signaling stage since I can always find two types such that the reasoning above applies.
As noted in the introduction, many different forms of conflict can be understood as fixed-
outcome lotteries: trials, strikes, and especially wars. In all these cases, Proposition 1 indicates
that there is no decentralized mechanism which permits information transmission. This result may
provide a rationale for why armed conflict actually break out. One of the criticism of bargaining
models of war is that as we get closer to the onset of war, uncertainty should be resolved. Propo-
sition 1 shows that this need not be the case. Any action by a belligerent prior to his opponent’s
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final offer has no informative content. Only the beginning or not of military actions is informa-
tive about an interested party’s type (one—important—limitation to the whole analogy is that
the unique pooling equilibrium features no type engaging in costly signaling: s∗S(kS) = 0 for all
kS ∈ KS).
I now turn to offer-dependent lottery. First, I consider whether conflict can always be avoided,
that is, whether a separating equilibrium exists. Unlike fixed-outcome lotteries, the answer is
positive, though under specific conditions. In particular, it is necessary, but not sufficient, that
the type-space is discrete.
Proposition 2. Denote K the cardinality of KS. For all offer-dependent lotteries, a separating
equilibrium exists if and only if
1. The type-space KS is discrete;
2. There exist a K-dimension vector s∗S = (s
∗
S(k
1
S), . . . , s
∗
S(k
K
S )) satisfying for all j ∈ {1, . . . , K−1}:
C(s∗S(k
j
S), k
j
S)− C(s∗S(kj+1S ), kjS) + (kj+1S − kjS) ≤ v(acR(kj+1S ))− v(acR(kjS))
≤ C(s∗S(kjS), kj+1S )− C(s∗S(kj+1S ), kj+1S ) (3)
To understand this result, consider again he strategy of two types klS, k
h
S ∈ K2S, klS < khS. As
above, a separating equilibrium exists only if a type-khS does not want to imitate a type-k
l
S and a
type-klS is willing to distinguish himself from its higher cost counterpart. For a high-cost Sender, the
benefit of imitation is still the gain from a more favorable compromise offer: v(acR(k
l
S))−v(acR(khS))
with acR(kS) such that −v(acR(kS)) = −EL
(
v(z)|aR = acR(kS)
)−kS (note the dependence of lottery
outcomes on acR(kS)). In turn, if the low-cost Sender pretends to be a type k
h
S, it starts a conflict
after the Receiver offers the compromise acR(k
h
S). This means that a low-cost Sender’s benefit from
differentiation is: v(acR(k
l
S)) −
(
EL
(
v(z)|aR = acR(khS)
)
+ klS
)
< v(acR(k
l
S)) − v(acR(khS)). Observe
that since conflict is an offer-dependent lottery, a low-cost Sender’s benefit from differentiation is
no longer null. Nonetheless, due to the possibility of starting a conflict, it is strictly lower than a
high-cost Sender’s benefit from imitation. The signaling cost to guarantee separation must thus
be sufficiently large to encourage a type-khS Sender not to imitate a lower cost, but also sufficiently
small to guarantee that a type-k − Sl Sender reveals his type. When the Senders’ possible costs
of conflict are very close (e.g., KS contains an interval), there never exists a signaling strategy
sS which satisfies both conditions. Hence, a separating equilibrium can only exist if the Sender’s
possible costs take discrete values. In addition, Condition 3 also needs to be satisfied. This
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condition imposes additional restrictions on the distance between the Sender’s possible costs. To
better interpret Condition 3, the next example provides a useful illustration.
Example 1. Suppose z(aR) = {a, aR}, with Pr(z = aR) = 1−p ∈ (0, 1), and C(sS, kS) = sS×kS.
The compromise offer acR(k
j
S) satisfies v(a
c
R(k
j
S)) = v(a) +
kjS
p
. A separating equilibrium exists if
and only if for all j ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1} kjS ≤ (1− p)kj+1S .
Under the assumptions, a separating equilibrium guarantees no conflict. Can we obtain a
similar outcome when we allow for coarser information transmission at the signaling stage (i.e.,
the Sender plays a semi-separating strategy)? As the next proposition shows, in addition to an
amended Condition 3, conflict is avoided in a semi-separating equilibrium only if the Receiver is,
in some sense, conflict-adverse and compromises with all types playing the same signaling strategy.
Before stating formally the result, it is useful to introduce the following notation. For all KmS ⊆ KS,
denote kmS := minK
m
S .
Proposition 3. For all offer-dependent lottery, there exists a semi-separating equilibrium with no
conflict if and only if there exists a partition of the type space KS into M ≥ 2 subsets K1S, . . . , KMS
and sssS = {s1S, . . . , sMS } such that for all m ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1}:
1. maxKmS < minK
m+1
S
2. v(acR(k
m+1
S ))− v(acR(kmS )) ≤ C(smS , km+1S )− C(sm+1S , km+1S );
3. For all kS ∈ KmS , C(smS , kS)− C(sm+1S , kS) + km+1S − kS ≤ v(acR(km+1S ))− v(acR(kmS ));
4. For all smS , a
c
R(k
m
S ) ∈ arg maxE
(
UR(aR, fS)|kS ∈ KmS
)
.
Condition 1 in Proposition 3 documents that in any semi-separating equilibrium, partition sets
are ordered. Condition 2 establishes a simple condition so that a high-cost Sender does not imitate
a Sender with a lower cost. More interestingly, Condition 3 highlights the difficulty to sustain a
semi-separating equilibrium (an appropriately modified Condition 3 applies to all semi-separating
equilibria). A Sender’s incentive compatibility constraint must be satisfied not just for the extrema
in the partition sets of the type space, but also for almost all interior costs (i.e., for all kS ∈ KmS ,
m ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1}) . This result boils down again to the shadow of conflict. As in traditional
signaling games, the cost of differentiation—i.e., signaling cost—is increasing with a Sender’s cost
of conflict kS: C(s
m
S , kS)−C(sm+1S , kS) is increasing in kS by the increasing differences assumption.
In addition, unlike traditional signaling games, in this set-up, the benefit from differentiation is
also strictly increasing in the Sender’s cost of conflict kS since a relatively low-cost Sender starts
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a conflict when it mimics a relatively high type (i.e., send signal sm+1S instead of s
m
S ): k
m+1
S − kS
decreases with kS. The combination of these two effects imply that it is a priori unclear which
type in the set KmS has the greatest incentive to imitate a relatively high-cost Sender. Finally,
Condition 4 stresses that a no-conflict semi-separating equilibrium requires strong assumption
on the Receiver’s utility function. There must exist a partition which satisfies Conditions 1-3
and induces full compromise on the Receiver’s part. Overall, Proposition 3 suggests that only
separating equilibria (when they exist) can be expected to bring peace.
3 Conclusion
This paper establishes that signaling is unlikely to resolve one of the main sources of conflict:
informational asymmetries. A separating equilibrium exists only under restrictive conditions in-
cluding: (i) the outcome of the conflict must depend on the Receiver’s previous offer and (ii) the
Sender’s privately known cost of conflict must take discrete values. Conditions for existence of
a semi-separating equilibrium are no less stringent and such equilibria are unlikely to guarantee
no conflict on path. I further establish a strong negative result. If the outcomes of conflict are
independent of previous actions, no information is ever revealed in equilibrium for all possible form
of uncertainty and payoffs. This suggest that in various settings, such as war or plea bargaining, no
decentralized mechanism permits any form of information transmission between interested parties.
In Appendix B and C, I explore the robustness of this striking result. I show that the impossi-
bility to transmit any information with signaling remains when the Sender has better information
about his winning probabilities rather than his cost of conflict (Proposition B.1). A similar nega-
tive conclusion holds when both the Sender and Receiver face a positive recognition probability to
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer (Proposition C.1). Some information can be transmitted, however,
if we allow for a bargained solution between the Sender and Receiver, though much depends on the
Sender’s bargaining power (Propositions C.2 and C.3). This last finding provides an interesting
counterpoint to Banks (1990). In his seminal contribution, Banks establishes general properties
of bargained outcomes in the shadow of wars for all possible bargaining protocols. My results
highlight that no such general property exists when it comes to information transmission.
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A Proofs
Define Ac(kS) := {aR ∈ [a, a] : −v(aR) = −EL
(
v(z)|aR
) − kS} the set of actions which leave a
type-kS Sender indifferent between conflict (fS = 1) and no conflict (fS = 0). Further, define
Ap :=
{
apR ∈ [a, a] : apR ∈ arg max
aR∈[a,a]
E
(
UR(aR, fS)|kS ∈ KS
)}
the set of offers which maximize the
Sender’s expected utility when no information is transmitted at the signaling stage. I formalise
the assumptions in the main text as:
Assumption 1. −EL
(
v(z)|aR = a
)− kS ≤ −v(a)
Assumption 2. −EL
(
v(z)|aR = a
)− kS ≥ −v(a)
Assumption 3. For all kS ∈ KS, maxAc(kS) satisfies r(maxAc(kS)) ≥ EL
(
r(z)|aR = a
)− kR
Assumption 4. There exist kS ∈ KS such that minAp > maxAc(kS).
Assumption 1 guarantees that there always exists a Receiver’s action aR that the Sender prefers to
a conflict. Assumption 2 implies that the Receiver can (almost) never offer the highest action and
avoids a conflict. Assumption 3 guarantees that the Receiver is willing to compromise after learning
the Sender’s cost of conflict. These three assumptions are necessary for a separating equilibrium to
exist at least when the type-space is an interval (see Lemma A.1). Finally, Assumption 4 implies
that informational asymmetries are a source of conflict. These assumptions guarantee that I focus
on cases when signaling plays an important role to avoid a conflict. As explained in the main text,
these assumptions are with little loss of generality since I can always redefine the type space so
they hold.
Lemma A.1. Suppose KS = [kS, kS] and Assumption 1, 2, or 3 does not hold, then there is no
equilibrium in which the Sender plays a separating strategy.
Before proving the result, I prove two preliminary claims.
Claim 1. In a separating equilibrium, after signal s∗S(kS), the Receiver’s best response a
∗
R(s
∗
S(kS))
is either a∗R(s
∗
S(kS)) ∈ Ac(kS) or a∗R(s∗S(kS)) = a.
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Proof. To see that, observe first that if −EL
(
v(z)|aR = a
) − kS ≤ −v(a), the Sender does not
start a conflict when the Receiver chooses her preferred action. The Receiver’s best response is
then a∗R(s
∗
S(k
1
S)) = a.
Assume now that−EL
(
v(z)|aR = a
)−kS < −v(a) and Ac(kS) is non-empty. We now show that any
action aR /∈ Ac(kS)∪{a} is (weakly) dominated by some other offer. First take aR /∈ Ac(kS)∪{a} so
that fS(aR; kS) = 0. Under the assumption ad by definition of A
c(kS), there exists a
c
R(kS) ∈ Ac(kS)
such that (i) acR(kS) > aR and (ii) f(a
c
R(kS); kS) = 0 and so provides a higher payoff than aR.
Now take aR /∈ Ac(kS) ∪ {a} so that fS(aR; kS) = 1. Recall that EL
(
r(z)|aR
)
is increasing in aR
(strictly if the lottery is offer-dependent) so that offer a dominates aR (strictly if the lottery is offer-
dependent). In a fixed-outcome lottery, the Receiver may be indifferent between aR /∈ Ac(kS)∪{a}
so that fS(aR; kS) = 1 and a. However, it is without loss of generality to impose a
∗
R(s
∗
S(kS)) = a.
Suppose now that Ac(kS) is empty. This means that the Receiver cannot avoid a challenge with
the Sender. By the reasoning above, her best response is then a∗R(s
∗
S(kS)) = a.
Claim 2. In a separating equilibrium, the Receiver’s best response a∗R(s
∗
S(kS)) must be such that
for all klS, k
h
S ∈ K2S, klS < khS, a∗R(s∗S(klS)) < a∗R(s∗S(khS)).
Proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction.
First, suppose that a∗R(s
∗
S(k
l
S)) ∈ Ac(klS) and a∗R(s∗S(khS)) ∈ Ac(khS), with a∗R(s∗S(klS)) > a∗R(s∗S(khS))
(this is possible since the set Ap(kS) may not be a singleton).
2 A type-k1S and a type-k
h
S Sender’s
incentive compatibility (IC) constraints must then satisfy respectively:
−v(a∗R(s∗S(klS)))− C(s∗S(klS), klS) ≥ −EL
(
v(z)|aR = a∗R(s∗S(khS))
)− klS − C(s∗S(khS), klS)
−v(a∗R(s∗S(khS)))− C(s∗S(khS), khS) ≥ −v(a∗R(s∗S(klS)))− C(s∗S(klS), khS)
By definitions of Ac(kS), a type-k
l
S Sender engages in a challenge when he mimics a type-k
h
S; that
is, −EL
(
v(z)|aR = a∗R(s∗S(khS))
) − klS > −v(a∗R(s∗S(khS))). A necessary conditions for the two (IC)
2If a∗R(s
∗
S(k
l
S)) = a
∗
R(s
∗
S(k
h
S)), then it can be checked that both types should send the same signal, contradicting
the equilibrium is separating.
13
constraints to simulatenously hold is then:
C(s∗S(k
h
S), k
h
S)− C(s∗S(klS), khS) ≤ v(a∗R(s∗S(klS)))− v(a∗R(s∗S(khS))) < C(s∗S(khS), klS)− C(s∗S(klS), klS)
Given v(a∗R(s
∗
S(k
l
S))) − v(a∗R(s∗S(khS))) > 0 under the assumption, we must have s∗S(khS) > s∗S(klS)
and C(s∗S(k
h
S), k
h
S) − C(s∗S(klS), khS) < C(s∗S(khS), klS) − C(s∗S(klS), klS), which is impossible by the
increasing differences assumption.
Second, suppose that a∗R(s
∗
S(k
l
S)) = a and a
∗
R(s
∗
S(k
h
S)) ∈ Ac(khS). The (IC) constraints of respec-
tively a type-klS and a type-k
h
S senders are, respectively:
−EL
(
v(z)|aR = a
)− klS − C(sS(klS), klS) ≥ −EL(v(z)|aR = a∗R(sS(khS)))− klS − C(sS(khS), klS)
−EL
(
v(z)|aR = a
)− khS − C(sS(klS), khS) ≤ −v(a∗R(sS(khS)))− C(sS(khS), khS)
Using the definition of Ac(kS), the second inequality is equivalent to:
−EL
(
v(z)|aR = a
)− khS − C(sS(klS), khS) ≤ −EL(v(z)|aR = a∗R(sS(khS)))− khS − C(sS(khS), khS)
Both (IC) constraints are satisfied only if
C(sS(k
h
S), k
h
S)− C(sS(klS), khS) ≤ EL
(
v(z)|aR = a
)−EL(v(z)|aR = a∗R(sS(khS)))
≤ C(sS(khS), klS)− C(sS(klS), klS)
Given EL
(
v(z)|aR = a
) − EL(v(z)|aR = a∗R(sS(khS))) ≥ 0, we must have s∗S(khS) > s∗S(klS) (if
the signals are equal, the equilibrium cannot be separating) and C(s∗S(k
h
S), k
h
S)− C(s∗S(klS), khS) <
C(s∗S(k
h
S), k
l
S)− C(s∗S(klS), klS), which is impossible by the increasing differences assumption.
Finally, suppose a∗R(s
∗
S(k
′
S)) = a = a
∗
R(s
∗
S(k
′′
S)). The equilibrium then cannot be separating since
both types send the same signal.
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Proof of Lemma A.1
If Assumption 1 does not hold, then there exists kfS > kS such that in any equilibrium, for all
kS ∈ [kS, kfS) and aR ∈ [a, a], f ∗S(aR; kS) = 1. As a result, the Receiver’s best response to s∗S(kS)
for all kS ∈ [kS, kfS) is a∗R(s∗S(kS)) = a leading to a contradiction by Claim 2.3
If Assumption 2 is violated, there exists knfS < kS such that for all kS ∈ [knfS , kS], the Receiver’s
best response to s∗S(kS) for all kS ∈ [kS, kfS) is a∗R(s∗S(kS)) = a leading to a contradiction by Claim
2.
Finally, suppose Assumption 3 is violated. First note that the strategy profile aR(s
∗
S(kS)) = a
and aR(s
∗
S(kS)) < a for all kS < kS and kS ∈ KS cannot be an equilibrium strategy profile if As-
sumption 2 holds. Indeed, if the Receiver prefers to generate a conflict after learning the Sender’s
type is kS, she also prefers to generate a conflict for kS < kS since she then must offer a lower
offer aR to avoid a challenge. So if there is a positive ex-ante probability of conflict on the equi-
librium path, it must be that for some kS ∈ int(KS), a∗R(s∗S(kS)) = a. But this violates Claim 2.
Corollary 1. If Assumptions 1-3 hold, in a separating equilibrium, the Receiver’s best response is
a∗R(s
∗
S(kS)) = maxA
c(kS) for all kS ∈ KS.
Proof. Given Assumption 3, if Ac(kS) is not empty, then a
∗
R(s
∗
S(kS)) ∈ Ac(kS). By Assumption
1 and 2, Ac(kS) is not empty. The Receiver then obviously chooses the highest possible offer in
Ac(kS).
In what follows, I use the shorthand acR(kS) := maxA
c(kS) to denote the Receiver’s best-response
after signal s∗S(kS)—a
∗
R(s
∗
S(kS))—in a separating equilibrium. Recall that I label a
c
R(kS) the com-
promise offer.
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof proceeds in three steps. First, I prove that the Sender never plays a separating strategy
in equilibrium. Second, I establish that there never exists a semi-separating equilibrium. Finally,
3Note that if the conflict is a fixed-outcome lottery, all types kS ∈ [kS , kfS) gets the same expected payoff for all
aR ∈ [a, a] and no separation is possible.
15
I show that there does not exist any mixed strategy equilibrium.
Step 1. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose first that there exists a separating equilib-
rium and denote a type-kS Sender’s signal s
∗
S(kS) for all kS ∈ KS and all possible type-space KS.
Consider two types klS, k
h
S ∈ K2S with klS < khS. The (IC) constraint of a type-khS Sender relative to
a type klS is:
−v(acR(khS))− C(s∗S(khS), khS) ≥ −v(acR(klS))− C(s∗S(klS), khS) (4)
Since acR(k
h
S) > a
c
R(k
l
S), it is necessary that s
∗
S(k
′′
S) > s
∗
S(k
′
S) to satisfy the high type’s (IC)
constraint.
Consider now the (IC) constraint of a type-klS relative to a type-k
h
S.
−v(acR(klS))− C(s∗S(klS), klS) ≥ −EL
(
v(z)
)− klS − C(s∗S(khS), klS) (5)
Observe that since acR(k
l
S) < a
c
R(k
h
S) (Claim 2 and Corollary 1), when a type-k
l
S mimics a type-k
h
S
Sender by sending signal s∗S(k
h
S), he starts a conflict after the Receiver offers a
c
R(k
h
S) and obtains
−EL
(
v(z)
)−klS since the conflict is a fixed-outcome lottery. By definition of acR(klS), −v(acR(klS)) =
−EL
(
v(z)
)− klS. Hence, we can rewrite Equation 5 as:
−EL
(
v(z)
)− klS − C(s∗S(klS), klS) ≥ −EL(v(z))− klS − C(s∗S(khS), klS)
⇔ C(s∗S(klS), klS) ≤ C(s∗S(khS), klS)
It is thus necessary that s∗S(k
h
S) ≤ s∗S(klS) to satisfy the low-type’s (IC) constraint. Both (IC)
constraints cannot be satisfied simultaneously and a separating equilibrium does not exist.
Step 2. Consider the following semi-separating assessment in which there exists a partition of the
type space KS into M ≥ 2 subsets—K1S, . . . , KMS —such that for all kS ∈ KmS , m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}
sS(kS) = s
m
S . Denote K
c
S := {KmS : there exists kS ∈ intKmS s.t. a∗R(smS ) = acR(kS)}. That is, KcS
is the set of subsets KmS such that the Receiver compromises with some of the types in K
m
S . Using
the same reasoning as in step 1, it can be checked that if a semi-separating assessment is an equilib-
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rium, the cardinality of KcS is 1 (using the types {kS} such that a∗R(smS ) = acR(kS)). Hence, in any
semi-separating equilibrium, M = 2 and a∗R(s
m
S ) = a for m ∈ {1, 2}. However, by Assumption 3, for
any m ∈ {1, 2}, r(acR(minKmS )) ≥ EL
(
r(z)|aR = a
)− kR = EL(r(z)|aR = acR(maxKmS ))− kR (us-
ing the fixed-outcome property of the lottery L). Hence, a∗R(smS ) < acR(maxKmS ) for all m ∈ {1, 2}
which implies cardKcS > 1, a contradiction.
Step 3.For a mixed strategy equilibrium to exist, the Sender must be indifferent between two sig-
nals. Hence, there must exist a partition of the type space with cardinality greater than 1. But
we have seen that this is impossible by step 2.
Combining the three steps, the unique equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium.4
In what follows, I consider offer-dependent lottery. Recall that KS is not discrete if there exist
kaS < k
b
S such that [k
a
S, k
b
S] ⊂ KS. I first state a preliminary lemma which states some properties
of the Sender’s signaling strategy.
Lemma A.2. Suppose KS is not discrete. For all offer-dependent lotteries, in a separating
equilibrium, the Sender’s signaling strategy s∗S(kS) is continuous and strictly increasing for all
kS ∈ [kaS, kbS].
Proof. Consider two types klS, k
h
S ∈ [kaS, kbS]2 with klS < khS. The (IC) constraint of a type-khS
relative to a type-klS Sender is Equation 4. The (IC) constraint of a type-k
l
S relative to a type k
h
S.
−v(acR(klS))− C(s∗S(klS), klS) ≥ −EL
(
v(z)|aR = acR(khS)
)− klS − C(s∗S(khS), klS) (6)
by a similar reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1 (note, however, that the outcome of the
lottery now depends on the Receiver’s offer aR).
Observe that −v(acR(klS)) > −v(acR(khS)) (Corollary 1) so to satisfy Equation 4, it is neces-
sary that s∗S(k
l
S) > s
∗
S(k
h
S). Further, by definition of a
c
R(k
l
S), lim
klS↑khS
−E(v(z)|aR = acR(khS)) − klS =
−v(acR(khS). Using Equation 4 and Equation 6, it can then be checked that if sS(kS) is not contin-
uous, there exists a profitable deviation for types close enough to the discontinuity.
4Notice that given the Sender’s signaling strategy, the Receiver may mix between different actions. However,
this does not affect the proposition.
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Proof of Proposition 2
The proof proceeds in three steps. I first prove that Condition 1 is necessary. Second, I show that
Condition 2 is necessary. I finally prove sufficiency.
Step 1. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose KS is not discrete and a separating equilib-
rium exists with a type-kS Sender’s signal denoted s
∗
S(kS). From Lemma A.2, s
∗
S(kS) is continuous
and strictly increasing, so it is differentiable almost everywhere for all kS ∈ [kaS, kbS].
Take kmidS ∈ (kaS, kbS) such that s∗S(·) is differentiable at kmidS . Further define: khS = kmidS + δ and
klS = k
mid
S − δ with δ > 0. A necessary condition for existence of a separating equilibrium is that
a type-kmidS Sender does not want to mimic a type-k
h
S and a type-k
l
S. The (IC) constraints of a
type-kmidS Sender must satisfy using Equation 4 and Equation 6:
−v(acR(kmidS ))− C(s∗S(kmidS ), kmidS ) ≥ −v(acR(klS))− C(s∗S(klS), kmidS )
−v(acR(kmidS ))− C(s∗S(kmidS ), kmidS ) ≥ −EL
(
v(z)|aR = acR(khS)
)− kmidS − C(s∗S(khS), kmidS )
Using −v(acR(kS)) = −EL
(
v(z)|aR = acR(kS)
)− kS, we can rewrite the (IC) constraints as:
−EL
(
v(z)|aR = acR(kmidS )
)− kmidS − C(s∗S(kmidS ), kmidS ) ≥ −EL(v(z)|aR = acR(klS))− klS − C(s∗S(klS), kmidS )
−EL
(
v(z)|aR = acR(kmidS )
)− kmidS − C(s∗S(kmidS ), kmidS ) ≥ −EL(v(z)|aR = acR(khS))− kmidS − C(s∗S(khS), kmidS )
Rearranging and using the definitions of klS and k
h
S, I obtain:
C(s∗S(k
mid
S − δ), kmidS )− C(s∗S(kmidS ), kmidS ) ≥ EL
(
v(z)|aR = acR(kmidS )
)− EL(v(z)|aR = acR(kmidS − δ))+ δ
(7)
C(s∗S(k
m
S ), k
mid
S )− C(s∗S(kmidS + δ), kmidS ) ≤ EL
(
v(z)|aR = acR(kmidS + δ)
)− EL(v(z)|aR = acR(kmidS ))
(8)
Recall that EL
(
v(z)|aR
)
=
N∑
j=1
pjv(zj(aR)) and is differentiable in aR since v(·) is C1. This also
implies that acR(kS) is differentiable in kS for kS ∈ [kaS, kSb]. Further, by definition, s∗S(·) is
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differentiable at kmidS so lim
kS↑kmidS
∂s∗S(kS)
∂kS
= lim
kS↓kmidS
∂s∗S(kS)
∂kS
:=
∂s∗S(k
mid
S )
∂kS
. Dividing both Equation 7 and
Equation 8 by δ, taking the limits as δ goes to 0, and using the definition of derivatives, I obtain:
−∂s
∗
S(k
mid
S )
∂kS
∂C(s∗S(k
mid
S ), kS)
∂sS
≥ ∂EL
(
v(z)|aR = acR(kmidS )
)
∂aR
∂acR(k
mid
S )
∂kS
+ 1
−∂s
∗
S(k
mid
S )
∂kS
∂C(s∗S(k
mid
S ), kS)
∂sS
≤ ∂EL
(
v(z)|aR = acR(kmidS )
)
∂aR
∂acR(k
mid
S )
∂kS
Both inequalities clearly cannot be satisfied simultaneously, and I have thus reached a contradic-
tion.
Step 2. Suppose that KS := {k1S, . . . , kKS }. Using Equation 6 with klS = kjS and khS = kj+1S yields
the following (IC) constraint of a type-kjS relative to a type-k
j+1
S for all j ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}:
EL
(
v(z)|aR = acR(kj+1S )
)− v(acR(kjS)) ≥ C(s∗S(kjS), kjS)− C(s∗S(kj+1S ), kjS)− kjS
⇔ v(acR(kj+1S ))− v(acR(kjS)) ≥ C(s∗S(kjS), kjS)− C(s∗S(kj+1S ), kjS) + kj+1S − kjS (9)
The second line uses EL
(
v(z)|aR = acR(kj+1S )
)
= v(acR(k
j+1
S ))− kj+1S .
In turn, Equation 4 yields the following (IC) constraint of a type-kj+1S relative to a type-k
j
S:
C(s∗S(k
j
S), k
j+1
S )− C(s∗S(kj+1S ), kj+1S ) ≥ v(acR(kj+1S ))− v(acR(kjS)) (10)
The only choice variable in Equation 9 and Equation 10 is the signaling strategy: s∗S = (s
∗
S(k
1
S), . . . , s
∗
S(k
K
S )).
Hence, it is necessary that there exist signals s∗S(k
j
S) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , K} satisfying Equation 3
as claimed.
Step 3. I now show sufficiency. First, I show that if the local (IC) constraint (i.e., type-kjS and
type-kj+1S ’s incentives to deviate) holds for all j ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}, then all other (IC) constraints
are satisfied.
First, I show that if Equation 9 holds for all j ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1} then
v(acR(k
j+m
S ))− v(acR(kjS)) ≥ C(s∗S(kjS), kjS)− C(s∗S(kj+mS ), kjS) + kj+mS − kjS,
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for all m ∈ {1, . . . , K − j}. To see this, suppose j < K − 1 and m = 2:
v(acR(k
j+2
S ))− kj+2S −
(
v(acR(k
j
S))− kjS
)
=
(
v(acR(k
j+2
S ))− kj+2S −
(
v(acR(k
j+1
S ))− kj+1S
))
+
(
v(acR(k
j+1
S ))− kj+1S −
(
v(acR(k
j
S))− kjS
))
≥
(
C(s∗S(k
j+1
S ), k
j+1
S )− C(s∗S(kj+2S ), kj+1S )
)
+
(
C(s∗S(k
j
S), k
j
S)− C(s∗S(kj+1S ), kjS)
)
=C(s∗S(k
j
S), k
j
S)− C(s∗S(kj+2S ), kjS)
+
(
C(s∗S(k
j+1
S ), k
j+1
S )− C(s∗S(kj+2S ), kj+1S )
)
+
(
C(s∗S(k
j+2
S ), k
j
S)− C(s∗S(kj+1S ), kjS)
)
The inequality comes from the assumption that Equation 9 holds for all j. By a similar reasoning
as in the proof of Lemma A.2, in a separating equilibrium s∗S(k
j
S) > s
∗
S(k
j+1
S ) for all j. Using the
assumption that C(·, ·) exhibits strict increasing differences, we thus have:
(
C(s∗S(k
j+1
S ), k
j+1
S )− C(s∗S(kj+2S ), kj+1S )
)
−
(
C(s∗S(k
j+1
S ), k
j
S)− C(s∗S(kj+2S ), kjS)
)
> 0
This implies that
v(acR(k
j+2
S ))− kj+2S −
(
v(acR(k
j
S))− kjS
)
>C(s∗S(k
j
S), k
j
S)− C(s∗S(kj+2S ), kjS).
I can then use the same reasoning for m > 2 to prove the claim.
Finally, I show that if Equation 10 holds for all j ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1} then
C(s∗S(k
j
S), k
j+m
S )− C(s∗S(kj+mS ), kj+mS ) ≥ v(acR(kj+mS ))− v(acR(kjS)),
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for all m ∈ {1, . . . , K − j}. To see this, suppose again j < K − 1 and m = 2:
v(acR(k
j+2
S ))− v(acR(kjS)) =
(
v(acR(k
j+2
S ))− v(acR(kj+1S ))
)
+
(
v(acR(k
j+1
S ))− v(acR(kjS))
)
≤
(
C(s∗S(k
j+1
S ), k
j+2
S )− C(s∗S(kj+2S ), kj+2S )
)
+
(
C(s∗S(k
j
S), k
j+1
S )− C(s∗S(kj+1S ), kj+1S )
)
=C(s∗S(k
j
S), k
j+2
S )− C(s∗S(kj+2S ), kj+2S )
+
(
C(s∗S(k
j+1
S ), k
j+2
S )− C(s∗S(kjS), kj+2S )
)
+
(
C(s∗S(k
j
S), k
j+1
S )− C(s∗S(kj+1S ), kj+1S )
)
Using again the strict increasing difference properties of C(·, ·), I obtain:
(
C(s∗S(k
j
S), k
j+1
S )− C(s∗S(kj+1S ), kj+1S )
)
−
(
C(s∗S(k
j
S), k
j+2
S )− C(s∗S(kj+1S ), kj+2S )
)
< 0.
Therefore,
v(acR(k
j+2
S ))− v(acR(kjS)) < C(s∗S(kjS), kj+2S )− C(s∗S(kj+2S ), kj+2S )
I can then use the same reasoning for m > 2 to prove the claim.
Second, I show that a separating equilibrium exists if there exists a vector of signals such that
Equation 3 holds. Consider the following assessment:
• For all j ∈ {1, . . . , K}, a type-kjS Sender sends signal sS(kjS) with sS(kKS ) = sS(kS) = 0;
• sS = {sS(k1S), . . . , sS(kKS )} is such that Equation 3 holds;
• Upon observing sS(kjS) for all j, the Receiver’s belief is that the Sender’s type is kjS with
probability 1 and her strategy is aR(sS(k
j
S)) = a
c
R(k
j
S);
Upon observing ŝS /∈ sS, the Receiver’s out-of-equilibrium is that the Sender’s type is kS
with probability 1 and her strategy is then aR(ŝS) = a
c
R(kS);
• For all j, a type-kjS Sender chooses fS = 0 if and only if aR ≤ acR(kjS) and fS = 1 otherwise.
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It can be checked that (i) the Receiver’s beliefs satisfy Bayes’ Rule on the equilibrium path,
(ii) the Receiver’s strategy is a best response given her (in or out-of-equilibrium) belief, (iii) the
Sender’s (IC) constraints hold for all types (in particular, the Receiver’s strategy implies that for
all j ∈ {1, . . . , K}, any signal ŝS /∈ sS is not a profitable deviation if Equation 3 holds), and (iv)
the Sender’s conflict strategy is a best response to any Receiver’s offer aR.
5 Hence, the assessment
described above is a PBE.
Details for Example 1
Under the parametrization, the compromise offer for a type-kjS satisfies: −v(acR(kjS)) = −pv(a)−
(1− p)v(acR(kjS))− kjS, or equivalently v(acR(κjS)) = v(a) + k
j
S
p
. Plugging the value of v(acR(k
j
S)) into
Condition 3, I obtain that a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a separating
equilibrium is for all j ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}:
kjS(s
∗
S(k
j
S)− s∗S(kj+1S )) + kj+1S − kjS ≤
kj+1S − kjS
p
≤ kj+1S (s∗S(kjS)− s∗S(kj+1S ))
This is equivalent to:
kj+1S − kjS
p
1
kj+1S
≤ s∗S(kjS)− s∗S(kj+1S ) ≤
kj+1S − kjS
p
1− p
kjS
Hence, we can always find signaling values s∗S such that a separating equilibrium exists if and only
if for all j ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}:
1
kj+1S
≤ 1− p
kjS
⇔ kjS ≤ (1− p)kj+1S
Proof of Proposition 3
I only prove necessity. Sufficiency follows from a similar argument as in the proof of Proposition
2.
Condition 1. I prove the result for all semi-separating equilibria. Under the assumption on
5Observe that the signaling strategy satisfies s∗S(kS) = 0 in any separating equilibrium.
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the Receiver’s utility function, after smS , the Receiver’s best response must satisfy a
ss
R (s
m
S ) ∈
[acR(k
m
S ), a
c
R(maxK
m
S )). Denote k
ss
S (m) such that a
c
R(k
ss
S (m)) = a
ss
R (sS(m)) (such k
ss
S (m) exists,
otherwise the Receiver can increase her offer without increasing the probability of conflict by a
similar reasoning as in Claim 1, a profitable deviation). Suppose that there exists a semi-separating
equilibrium in which there exists m ∈ {1, . . . ,M −1} such that maxKmS > minKm+1S = km+1S . For
simplicity, assume that Km+1S is a convex set and denote k
m
S = maxK
m
S . We need to consider two
cases: (a) kssS (m) < minK
m+1
S and (b) k
ss
S (m) > minK
m+1
S .
Case (a): For a semi-separating equilibrium to exist, it must be that kssS (m+1) prefers signal s
m+1
S
to signal smS , or equivalently: v(a
ss
R (m+1)))−v(assR (m)) ≤ C(smS , kssS (m+1))−C(sm+1S kssS (m+1)).
In turn, a type-kmS must prefer s
m
S to s
m+1
S . Notice that a Sender with cost k
m
S does not start
a conflict when he sends signal smS or signal s
m+1
S , hence his incentive compatibility constraint
is: v(assR (m + 1)) − v(assR (m)) ≥ C(smS , kmS ) − C(sm+1S , kmS ). The two (IC) constraints imply
C(smS , k
ss
S (m + 1)) − C(sm+1S , kssS (m + 1)) ≥ C(smS , kmS ) − C(sm+1S , kmS ), but this contradicts the
strict increasing differences assumption.
Case (b): Consider now types kmS and k
m+1
S . Their (IC) constraints are respectively:
−EL
(
v(z)|assR (m)
)− kmS − C(smS , kmS ) ≥ −EL(v(z)|assR (m+ 1))− kmS − C(sm+1S , kmS )
−EL
(
v(z)|assR (m+ 1)
)− km+1S − C(sm+1S , km+1S ) ≥ −EL(v(z)|assR (m))− km+1S − C(smS , km+1S )
as both start a conflict (or km+1S is indifferent) after signals s
m
S and signals s
m+1
S . The two (IC)
imply that (i) smS < s
m+1
S (since EL
(
v(z)|assR (m)
)
> EL
(
v(z)|assR (m + 1)
)
) and (ii) C(sm+1S , k
m
S ) −
C(smS , k
m
S ) ≥ C(sm+1S , km+1S ) − C(smS , km+1S ). But this last condition violates the strict increasing
differences assumption, a contradiction.
Condition 2. Observe that by the assumption of strict increasing difference, if v(acR(k
m+1
S )) −
v(acR(k
m
S )) ≤ C(smS , km+1S ) − C(sm+1S , km+1S ), then for all kS ∈ Km+1S , v(acR(km+1S )) − v(acR(kmS )) ≤
C(smS , kS)− C(sm+1S ), kS).
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Condition 3. By the now usual reasoning, the upward (IC) constraint of a type kS ∈ KmS is for all
m ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1} is (see the proof of Proposition 2):
−v(acR(kmS ))− C(smS , kS) ≥ −EL
(
v(z)|acR(km+1S ))
)− kS − C(sm+1S , kS)
⇔ C(smS , kS)− C(sm+1S , kS) + km+1S − kS ≤ v(acR(km+1S ))− v(acR(kmS ))
The second line uses −EL
(
v(z)|acR(km+1S ))
)
= −v(acR(km+1S )) + km+1S . To see that it is not
enough that the (IC) constraint is satisfied by the extrema of set KmS , suppose that KS is
continuous L =< {0, aR}, {p, 1 − p} > and C(s, kS) = s × g(kS) with g′(·) > 0. It can be
checked then that smS − sm+1S = k
m+1
S −kmS
p
1
g(km+1S )
. The (IC) constraint of a type-kS ∈ KmS is then:
km+1S −kmS
p
g(kS)
g(km+1S )
− kS ≤ (1−p)k
m+1
S −kmS
p
. Denote K̂mS = [k
m
S , k
m+1
S ] (the smallest closed interval con-
taining KmS using Condition 1) and k
max
S (m) = arg maxkS∈K̂mS
km+1S −kmS
p
g(kS)
g(km+1S )
− kS. Depending on
g(·), kmaxS (m) can take any interior or extreme values in K̂mS .
Condition 4. If the condition does not hold, then it must be that there exists m such that if
kS = k
m
S , the Sender’s best response is to start a conflict after signal s
m
S and offer a
ss
R (s
m
S ). Hence,
conflict occurs on the equilibrium path.
B Uncertainty about winning probabilities
In this variation of the baseline model, I suppose that the Sender’s cost of conflict is common
knowledge and denoted kS. In turn, I suppose that the Sender has better information about the
probability that he wins the conflict. Formally, there exist a set Λ ⊆ [λ, λ], λ, λ ∈ Λ2 such that
the probability of outcome zj occurs is pj(λ), j ∈ {1, . . . , N} for all λ ∈ Λ. The lottery now takes
the form of L(aR;λ) =< z(aR),p(λ) >. Assume that λ’s are ordered such that for all λ, λ′ ∈ Λ
and λ < λ′, EL(v(z)|aR, λ) < EL(v(z)|aR, λ′) for all aR. Further, the signaling cost now satisfies
C(sS, λ) with the strict increasing differences still holding on sS and λ. The amended timing
satisfies
0. Nature draws λ according to the distribution G(·);
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1. Sender privately observes λ and sends signal sS ≥ 0;
2. Receiver observes sS and chooses aR ∈ [a, a];
3. Sender chooses fS ∈ {0, 1};
4. Nature determines outcome, game ends, and payoffs are realized.
Denote acR(λ) the compromise offer as a function of λ. That is, in the amended setting, a
c
R(λ)
satisfies −v(acR(λ)) = −EL
(
v(z)|acR(λ), λ
)− kS. Throughout this appendix I assume without loss
of generality that acR(λ) is unique. Further, as in the main text, I impose a
c
R(λ) ≥ a and acR(λ) ≤ a
so compromise is always possible and needed. Finally, as in the main text (Assumption 3), I also
assume that the Receiver is always willing to compromise: min
λ∈Λ
r(acR(λ)) −
(
EL
(
r(z)|acR(λ), λ
) −
kR
)
≥ 0. The next result extends Proposition 1 to this setting.
Proposition B.1. For all fixed-outcome lotteries and all type-space Λ, in any equilibrium, the
Sender plays a pooling strategy: s∗S(λ) = s
p
S for all λ ∈ Λ.
Proof. Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which there exists λl, λh ∈ Λ2 with λl < λh
such that s∗S(λ
l) 6= s∗S(λh). Assume without loss of generality that a∗R(s∗S(λl)) = acR(λl) and
a∗R(s
∗
S(λ
h)) = acR(λ
h) (such types must exist since the Receiver, otherwise, can increase her offer
without increasing the probability of conflict, a profitable deviation). A type-λl is willing to play
signaling strategy s∗S(λ
l) only if:
−v(acR(λl))− C(s∗S(λl), λl) ≥ −EL
(
v(z)|λl)− kS − C(s∗S(λh), λl)
⇔ −EL
(
v(z)|λl)− kS − C(s∗S(λl), λl) ≥ −EL(v(z)|λl)− kS − C(s∗S(λh), λl)
⇔ C(s∗S(λh), λl)− C(s∗S(λl), λl) ≥ 0
The first line comes from the fact that a type-λl starts a conflict when the Receiver proposes acR(λ
h)
after signal s∗S(λ
h). The second line comes from the definition of acR(λ
l).
In turn, a type-λh is willing to play signaling strategy s∗S(λ
h) only if:
−v(acR(λh))− C(s∗S(λh), λh) ≥ −v(acR(λl))− C(s∗S(λl), λh)
⇔ v(acR(λl))− v(acR(λh)) ≥ C(s∗S(λh), λl)− C(s∗S(λl), λh)
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Since acR(λ
l) < acR(λ
h), the two inequalities cannot be satisfied simultaneously, a contradiction.
C Different bargaining protocols
In this section, I assume as in the baseline model that the Receiver is uncertain about the cost
of conflict kS ∈ KS. Assumptions 1-4 of the baseline model hold in this Appendix. I further
impose that if the Sender were to make an offer, he would need to compromise as well: r(a) <
EL(r(z)|aR = a) − kR. I move away from tradition signaling games and consider two different
bargaining protocols in turn: 1) the Sender has a positive probability to make a take-it-or-leave-it
offer and 2) the offer is the result of some form of bargaining between the Receiver and Sender.
C.1 Different recognition probabilities
In this subsection, I assume that at the bargaining stage (stage 3 in the timing), there is a proba-
bility β ∈ (0, 1) (resp. 1−β) that the Receiver (resp. Sender) makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer (i.e.,
the bargaining protocol is a form of Rubinstein model with interior probability of recognition and
immediate breakdown into conflict upon offer rejection). If the offer is rejected, conflict ensues.
The baseline model corresponds to the case β = 1.
To account for the model amendment, I denote aB(J) ∈ [a, a] the offer as a function of the
player recognized to make an offer J ∈ {R, S}. After the offer of J ∈ {S,R}, the other player −J
decides whether to start a conflict: f−J ∈ {0, 1}. I denote acB(R; kS) the compromise offer when
R is recognized and a Sender’s cost is kS (i.e., a
c
B(R; kS) = a
c
R(kS)). The compromise offer when
S is recognized is: acB(S; kR) satisfying r(a
c
B(S; kR)) = EL(r(z)|aR = acB(S; kR)) − kR (assuming
existence and uniqueness). Throughout, I impose the equivalent of Assumption 3 for the Sender:
−v(acB(S; kR)) > −EL(v(z)|a) − kS. The rest of the model remains the same and the amended
timing is:
0. Nature draws kS according to the distribution F (·);
1. Sender privately observes kS and sends signal sS ≥ 0;
2. Receiver observes sS. Nature recognizes player J ∈ {R, S} to make offer aB(J) ∈ [a, a];
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3. Player −J chooses f−J ∈ {0, 1};
4. Nature determines outcome, game ends, and payoffs are realized.
The next result shows that Proposition 1 extends to this setting.
Proposition C.1. For all fixed-outcome lotteries and all type-space KS, in any equilibrium, the
Sender plays a pooling strategy: s∗S(kS) = s
p
S for all kS ∈ KS.
Proof. Denote aB(R; sS) the offer strategy of the Receiver if recognized as a function of the signal
sS. In turn, denote aB(S; kS) the strategy of the Sender if recognized as a function of his type.
Under the assumptions, aB(S; kS) = a
c
B(S; kR).
Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which there exist klS, k
h
S ∈ K2S with klS < khS such that
s∗S(k
l
S) 6= s∗S(khS). Assume without loss of generality that a∗B(R; s∗S(klS)) = acB(R; klS) and a∗B(R; s∗S(khS)) =
acB(R; k
h
S) (such types must exist since the Receiver, otherwise, can increase her offer without in-
creasing the probability of conflict, a profitable deviation). A type-klS is willing to play signaling
strategy s∗S(k
l
S) only if:
−
(
βv(acB(R; k
l
S))+(1− β)v(acB(S; kR))
)
− C(s∗S(klS), klS)
≥ −
(
β
(
EL
(
v(z)
)
+ klS
)
+ (1− β)v(acB(S; kR))
)
− C(s∗S(khS), klS)
⇔ −β(EL(v(z))+ klS)− C(s∗S(klS), klS) ≥ β(EL(v(z))+ klS)− C(s∗S(khS), klS)
⇔ C(s∗S(khS), klS)− C(s∗S(klS), klS) ≥ 0
The first line comes from the fact that a type-klS starts a conflict when the Receiver proposes
acB(R; k
h
S) after signal s
∗
S(k
h
S). The second line comes from a
c
B(R; k
l
S) = a
c
R(k
l
S).
In turn, a type-khS is willing to play signaling strategy s
∗
S(k
h
S) only if:
−
(
βv(acB(R; k
h
S))+(1− β)v(acB(S; kR))
)
− C(s∗S(khS), khS)
≥ −
(
βv(acB(R; k
l
S)) + (1− β)v(acB(S; kR))
)
− C(s∗S(klS), khS)
⇔ β(v(acB(R; klS))− v(acB(R; khS))) ≥ C(s∗S(khS), khS)− C(s∗S(klS), khS)
By the usual reasoning, the two inequalities cannot be satisfied simultaneously, a contradiction.
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C.2 Bargained compromise offer
In this subsection, I exogenously assume that at the bargaining stage, the offer is some action
strictly between R’s preferred offer (conditional on his information) and S’s preferred offer. I leave
the protocol which leads to this offer unmodeled.
Using the notation aB(J ; ·), denote amaxB (R; sS) = arg max
a∈[a,a]
E(UR(aR, fS)|sS) the Receiver’s
optimal offer following signal sS (with expectations over types and conflict outcomes in case
of conflict). For simplicity and without loss of generality, I assume that amaxB (R; sS) is unique.
As in the previous section, we assume that the Sender’s optimal offer for all costs kS ∈ KS is
amaxB (S; kS) = a
c
B(S; kR) the compromise offer. More formally, at stage 2, the offer on the table is:
aB(sS(kS)) = βa
max
B (R; sS(kS)) + (1− β)acB(S; kR) for β ∈ (0, 1). The baseline model corresponds
to β = 1. Using the assumptions, if sS(kS) fully reveals the Sender’s type, I denote the bargained
offer asB(kS) := βa
c
B(R; kS) + (1− β)acB(S; kR). The amended timing is:
0. Nature draws kS according to the distribution F (·);
1. Sender privately observes kS and sends signal sS ≥ 0;
2. Receiver observes sS. Nature offers aB(sS);
3. Sender and Receiver jointly choose fS, fR ∈ {0, 1}2;
4. Nature determines outcome, game ends, and payoffs are realized.
I now show that this form of bargaining protocol renders separation possible. The first result of
this subsection is that as long as the types are not too much apart and/or the bargained offer
does not vary much with the Sender’s cost of conflict (formally, asB(kS) ≤ acB(R; kS)), a separating
equilibrium always exists. The sufficient condition for existence, however, is relatively unsurprising
and quite stringent. It is relatively unsurprising because when the Sender has all bargaining power
(β → 0), there is never any conflict in equilibrium, and the condition stated in the Proposition
has the same spirit. It is quite stringent because it does not reduce the odds of conflict. Indeed,
as Corollary C.1 establishes, when the sufficient condition holds, there is no conflict on path in a
pooling equilibrium.
Proposition C.2. For all fixed-outcome lotteries and all type-spaces KS, a separating equilibrium
always exists if asB(kS) ≤ acB(R; kS).
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Proof. First, observe that the Receiver always chooses no conflict so we can focus on the Sender.
Suppose now the condition holds. This implies that for any two costs of conflict klS and k
h
S > k
l
S in
KS, the bargained offer satisfies: asB(khS) ≤ acB(R; klS). Hence a type-klS Sender’s best response in
stage 3 when he imitates a type-khS is fS(a
s
B(k
h
S); k
l
S) = 0. In this case, a type-k
l
S’s (IC) constraint
is:
−v(asB(klS))− C(sS(klS), klS) ≥ −v(asB(khS))− C(sS(khS), klS)
In turn, by the usual reasoning, a type-khS’s (IC) constraint is:
−v(asB(khS))− C(sS(khS), khS) ≥ −v(asB(klS))− C(sS(klS), khS)
Using the increasing differences assumption, it can be checked that we can always find a signaling
function sS(kS) which satisfies both (IC) constraints. Using a similar reasoning as Proposition 2,
I can then construct a separating equilibrium.
Corollary C.1. If asB(kS) ≤ acB(R; kS), for all fixed-outcome lotteries and all type-spaces KS, in
a pooling equilibrium, there is no conflict on path.
Proof. Consider a pooling equilibrium in which s∗S(kS) = s
p
S. Observe that the Receiver’s optimal
offer amaxB (R; s
p
S) = arg max
a∈[a,a]
E(UR(aR, fS)|spS) satisfies amaxB (R; spS) ∈ [acB(kS), acB(kS)) under As-
sumption 3. This implies that in a pooling equilibrium, the bargained offer satisfies for all kS ∈ KS,
aB(s
p
S) < a
s
B(kS). Under the condition, this implies that there is no conflict on path. It remains
to show that a pooling equilibrium exists. To do so, I can construct a pooling equilibrium by
choosing appropriate out-of-equilibrium belief as in the proof of Proposition 2.
The next proposition considers whether a separating equilibrium can exist if asB(kS) > a
c
B(R; kS).
Before stating the result, it is helpful to introduce some additional pieces of notation. Denote
kbS(kS) the unique solution to a
s
B(kS) = a
c
B(R; kS) and K
b
S = [kS, k
b
S(kS)]. Notice that for all
kS < k
b
S(kS), a type-kS Sender starts a conflict if he imitates the type-kS. In turn, for all k
l
S ∈ KbS
denote ktS(k
l
S) the unique solution to a
s
B(kS) = a
c
B(R; k
l
S) and K
t
S(k
l
S) = [k
t
S(k
l
S), kS]. Finally, natu-
rally extending kbS(·) denote for all khS ∈ KtS(kS) kbS(khS) the unique solution to asB(khS) = acB(R; kS).
I then obtain:
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Proposition C.3. Suppose asB(kS) > a
c
B(R; kS). For all fixed-outcome lotteries and all type-spaces
KS, a separating equilibrium exists if and only if there exists a strictly decreasing signaling function
s∗S(kS) satisfying for all k
l
S ∈ KbS ∩ KS and all khS ∈ KtS(kS) ∩ KS
C(s∗S(k
l
S), k
l
S)− C(s∗S(khS), klS) + kbS(khS)− klS ≤ v(asB(khS))− v(asB(klS))
≤ C(s∗S(klS), khS)− C(s∗S(khS), khS) (11)
Before proving the proposition, notice that Equation 11 takes a similar form as Equation 3
(or Condition 3 of Proposition 3). The presence of a bargained offer generates a benefit from
differentiation, which is absent when the Receiver makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. However, when
a relatively low-cost Sender (klS ∈ KbS ∩KS) is willing to start a conflict after imitating a relatively
high-cost Sender (khS ∈ KtS(kS) ∩KS), this benefit is limited and is equal to v(asB(khS))− kbS(khS)−(
v(asB(k
l
S)) − klS
)
. In turn, the benefit from imitation for a relatively high-cost Sender is always
large and equal to v(asB(k
h
S)) − v(asB(klS)) > v(asB(khS)) − kbS(khS) −
(
v(asB(k
l
S)) − klS
)
. Hence, the
existence of a separating equilibrium is not always guaranteed when the shadow of conflict looms
large (i.e., asB(kS) > a
c
B(R; kS)).
Proof. I start with necessity. Take two types klS ∈ KbS ∩ KS and khS ∈ KtS(kS) ∩ KS (the two sets
are not empty since kS, kS ∈ K2S). A type-klS’s (IC) constraint is then:
−v(asB(klS))− C(sS(klS), klS) ≥ −EL(v(z))− klS − C(sS(khS), klS)
⇔ −v(asB(klS))− C(sS(klS), klS) ≥ −v(asB(khS)) + kbS(khS)− klS − C(sS(khS), klS)
⇔ v(asB(khS))− v(asB(klS)) ≥ C(s∗S(klS), klS)− C(s∗S(khS), klS) + kbS(khS)− klS
The first line follows from a type-klS Sender starting a conflict after pretending to be a type k
h
S. The
second line comes from the definition of kbS(k
h
S): v(a
s
B(k
h
S)) = v(a
c
B(R; k
b
S(k
h
S)) = EL(v(z))+k
b
S(k
h
S).
By the usual reasoning, a type-khS (IC) constraint is:
v(asB(k
h
S))− v(asB(klS)) ≤ C(s∗S(klS), khS)− C(s∗S(khS), khS)
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For sufficiency, observe that if klS /∈ KbS ∩ KS or khS /∈ KtS(kS) ∩ KS, the (IC) constraints can be
satisfied by increasing differences following a similar reasoning as in the proof of Proposition C.2.
I can then use a similar argument as in the proof of Proposition 2 to finish the proof.
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